DeFiPunk'd

Ethena

3 deployments · $5.6B aggregate TVL · Basis Trading

Deployments

Each deployment is rated independently. Pick one to see its rating, risk analysis, and stage.

TVL $4.5B
Type Basis Trading
Chain Ethereum
View on DeFiLlama ↗
Control criteria
Upgradeability Immutable Bug bounty immunefi.com Governance forum governance.ethena.fi Docs docs.ethena.fi
About

Ethena is a synthetic dollar protocol that mints USDe, a delta-hedged stablecoin backed by stETH and short perpetual futures positions. Users stake USDe to receive sUSDe and earn yield from the protocol's net funding and basis spread revenue. The protocol uses multiple multisig wallets (dev owner, reserve fund, payout distributor) and a timelock to manage smart contract upgrades and parameter changes.

Risk analysis

One card per dimension, sorted by severity. Only Verifiability and Autonomy carry automated signals in Phase 0. See methodology for scope.

Audit a dimension yourself · DEFI@home Contribute an LLM-run assessment — any model, any dimension. Three agreeing runs merge automatically into the public record.

DEFI@home is a distributed audit network modeled on SETI@home: instead of CPU cycles, it crowdsources LLM reasoning. Paste a slice prompt into Claude, ChatGPT, Gemini, or any browsing-capable model, and submit the JSON output as a pull request. The quorum bot merges it once ≥3 independent runs (from different models) reach the same grade — no single model, and no single contributor, can move the needle alone. How it works →

  • Address discovery 9 addresses on file · 1 run Submit run ↗
  • Verifiability ✓ 3/3 models agree AI-only weak green — weak consensus margin; only 0/3 sources have a public chat share link; total support weight 0.12 below confidence floor (1.5) Submit run ↗
  • Control ✓ 3/3 models agree AI-only weak orange — only 0/3 sources have a public chat share link; total support weight 0.12 below confidence floor (1.5) Submit run ↗
  • Ability to exit ✓ 3/3 models agree AI-only weak red — weak consensus margin; only 0/3 sources have a public chat share link Submit run ↗
  • Autonomy ✓ 3/3 models agree AI-only weak red — only 0/3 sources have a public chat share link; total support weight 0.12 below confidence floor (1.5) Submit run ↗
  • Open Access ✓ 3/3 models agree AI-only weak red — weak consensus margin; only 0/3 sources have a public chat share link; total support weight 1.42 below confidence floor (1.5) Submit run ↗
  • Audit all 5 dimensions · one prompt Submit run ↗
  1. Verifiability tentative 3/3 models agree AI-only 0/3 with chat share link
    Core USDe, sUSDe, and EthenaMinting contracts verified on Etherscan with multi-firm audit coverage (Spearbit, Quantstamp, Zellic, Pashov, Cyfrin, Code4rena) and active Immunefi bug bounty up to $3M
    Verdict

    Choosing green because all three deployed core contracts (USDe 0x4c9EDD58..., sUSDe 0x9D39A5DE..., EthenaMinting V2 0xe3490297...) show 'Exact Match' verification on Etherscan, the source corresponds to public Code4rena contest repos, and the contracts are covered by multiple audits from recognized firms (Spearbit, Quantstamp, Zellic, Code4rena public+invitational) within the prompt's 6-month drift window when v2 (Pashov May 2024 + C4 Nov 2024) is taken as the relevant baseline. The orange steelman about audit age is mitigated by the Nov 2024 Code4rena Invitational covering recent changes; the red steelman about repo location is mitigated because the C4 contest repos are public, immutable, and explicitly the audited source. Note: this slice covers on-chain code verifiability only — off-chain components (custodian attestations, hedge transparency, reserve attestations) belong to separate slices (transparency / autonomy) and are NOT graded here.

    Steelman argument
    Steelman argument All three core contracts are 'Exact Match' verified on Etherscan, audited by multiple recognized firms (Spearbit, Quantstamp, Zellic, plus Code4rena public + invitational competitive audits, plus repeat Pashov reviews), USDtb integration was audited by three independent firms before launch, and a $3M Immunefi bug bounty has been live since April 2024 — the on-chain code verifiability posture meets every green criterion in the rubric.
    Evidence (6)
    V1
    USDe token (0x4c9EDD5852cd905f086C759E8383e09bff1E68B3) is verified on Etherscan as 'Exact Match', contract name USDe, Solidity v0.8.19, not a proxy. sUSDe (0x9D39A5DE30e57443BfF2A8307A4256c8797A3497) is verified as 'Exact Match', contract name StakedUSDeV2 (ERC-4626), Solidity v0.8.19, not a proxy. EthenaMinting V2 (0xe3490297a08d6fc8da46edb7b6142e4f461b62d3) is verified as 'Exact Match', contract name EthenaMinting, Solidity v0.8.20, not a proxy. All three are non-proxy/non-upgradeable per explorer page (no proxy banner).
    V2
    Source corresponds to public Code4rena contest repos at github.com/code-423n4/2023-10-ethena (v1) and github.com/code-423n4/2024-11-ethena-labs (v2 incl. updated minting). Ethena's own org github.com/ethena-labs hosts adapter and minting client repos but the core protocol contracts source is published primarily via the C4 contest repos. No local bytecode-diff was performed in this run.
    V3
    Audit links page enumerates: Zellic (v1, initial), Quantstamp (v1, 2023-10-18; USDtb 2024-10-25), Spearbit (v1, 2023-10-18), Pashov (v1 2023-10-22; ENA/LP 2023-12-22; v2 2024-05-23; sENA 2024-09-02; USDtb 2024-10-20), Code4rena (v1 public 2023-11-13; invitational 2024-11), Cyfrin (USDtb 2024-10-31), Chaos Labs (economic risk). All audits state no critical/high issues outstanding at sign-off.
    V4
    Recognized firms in the rubric list cover the core protocol: Spearbit, Quantstamp, Zellic, plus Code4rena (public competitive audit). Pashov and Cyfrin are well-known specialists (not on the rubric's named list but broadly recognized) and provide additional coverage. USDtb (post-2024-12 integration) was audited in three concurrent reviews (Quantstamp, Cyfrin, Pashov) before launch.
    V5
    Most recent v2 protocol audit covering EthenaMinting V2 was Pashov (May 2024) and Code4rena Invitational (Nov 2024). Deployed EthenaMinting V2 at 0xe3490297 falls within this audit window. No evidence of post-Nov-2024 redeploy of these specific addresses; USDe and sUSDe contracts have been deployed since 2023 (deployer notes ~2y on Etherscan) and have been continuously in audit scope across multiple v1+v2 reviews.
    V6
    All three core contracts (USDe, sUSDe, EthenaMinting V2) are non-proxy implementations, so the proxy/implementation verification distinction does not apply — they are verified directly.
    Why is this consensus tentative?
    • weak consensus margin
    • only 0/3 sources have a public chat share link
    • total support weight 0.12 below confidence floor (1.5)

    A fresh independent run can strengthen (or overturn) the verdict.

    Run your own prompt Submit run ↗
    Sources claude-opus-4-7 no url gpt-5.5 no url gemini-3-flash-preview no url View raw submissions ↗
  2. Control tentative 3/3 models agree AI-only 0/3 with chat share link
    Multisig-controlled mint, redeem and staking with documented 7-day timelock; no on-chain governance vote, no Security Council.
    Verdict

    Choosing orange because the highest reachable tier on the uncontested fast path is T1 (admin can blacklist sUSDe holders, change custodians, and grant minter role with no on-chain timelock), the 7-day delay is procedural rather than enforced by a Timelock contract verified on Etherscan, and the Dev multisig signers are not publicly identified — failing the Security Council 'publicly announced signers' and 'on-chain enforced delay' criteria for green. The non-upgradeable core and 5/11 threshold keep it well above red, where a 2-of-3 EOA-style configuration would sit.

    Steelman argument
    Steelman argument Core fund-holding contracts are immutable (no proxy admin can swap implementations), the 5/11 threshold > simple majority, the gatekeeper/admin asymmetry prevents single-signer fund seizure, and the protocol publicly commits to a 7-day timelock for core changes; this is meaningfully better than a 2-of-3 EOA setup but lacks the on-chain timelock + Security Council needed for green.
    Evidence (8)
    C1
    USDe (0x4c9edd58...e68b3) is a non-proxy ERC20 with Ownable2Step owner and a separate `minter` setter; the deploy-time admin/owner is the Ethena Dev multisig 0x3B0AAf6e6fCd4a7cEEf8c92C32DFeA9E64dC1862. EthenaMintingV2 (0xe3490297...62D3) is also a non-proxy contract using AccessControl with DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE held by the same multisig.
    C1
    StakedUSDeV2 / sUSDe (0x9d39a5de...3497) is non-proxy, ERC4626 with AccessControl; DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE / REWARDER_ROLE / blacklist roles all administered by the Dev multisig. Cooldown duration on-chain reads ~90 days (MAX_COOLDOWN_DURATION) range bound.
    C2
    All three core contracts (USDe, EthenaMinting V2, StakedUSDeV2) are NON-upgradeable direct deployments — there is no transparent / UUPS / Beacon proxy and no proxy admin. Powerful changes (e.g. swapping the mint contract) require deploying new contract + admin reconfiguration rather than slot replacement.
    C3
    No on-chain Governor / Timelock contract exists on the upgrade path. The 'execution path' for privileged changes is: Ethena Dev multisig (Safe) → direct call to admin function on target contract. The 7-day delay cited in docs is a procedural / off-chain commitment of the multisig signers, NOT an on-chain enforced timelock contract.
    C4
    Three multisigs documented at key-addresses: Dev 0x3b0aaf6e...c1862 (5/11 per docs, role: owner of all mainnet contracts, can modify parameters and roles); sUSDe Payout Fund 0x71e4f98e...a3a87 (3/11, distributes USDe to staking rewards); Reserve Fund 0x2b5ab59...d4d5 (4/10, manages reserve). All are Gnosis Safe (GnosisSafeProxy, Safe Singleton 1.3.0). Signer identities are not publicly listed — docs say 'distinct individuals both within and outside Ethena Labs', which fails the Security Council 'publicly announced signers' criterion.
    C5
    No on-chain Governor contract. ENA token (0x57e114B6...e6061) is used for off-chain Snapshot voting and bi-annual Risk Committee elections via gov.ethenafoundation.com. No Governor / GovernorBravo / OZ Governor / Aragon Voting / Timelock executable path exists — Snapshot results are advisory and executed by the multisig manually.
    C6
    Emergency pause is held by GATEKEEPER_ROLE, which can DISABLE minting/redeeming and remove minter/redeemer roles, but CANNOT re-enable functions or perform other admin actions. Re-enable requires DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (the Dev multisig). This asymmetry means a gatekeeper can halt issuance instantly, but only the slow path (multisig signing) can resume.
    C7
    Highest reachable tier on the uncontested fast path = T1. The Dev multisig (DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) on EthenaMinting V2 can set/remove minter & redeemer roles, set custodian addresses, and approve new collateral assets — directly affecting where user-deposited backing flows. On StakedUSDeV2 it can grant REWARDER_ROLE, blacklist users (block redemption), and rescue tokens. There is NO on-chain timelock contract enforcing the 7-day delay; the delay is a procedural commitment, so the on-chain fast path is effectively immediate (one Safe execution after threshold met).
    Why is this consensus tentative?
    • only 0/3 sources have a public chat share link
    • total support weight 0.12 below confidence floor (1.5)

    A fresh independent run can strengthen (or overturn) the verdict.

    Run your own prompt Submit run ↗
    Sources claude-opus-4-7 no url gpt-5.5 no url gemini-3-flash-preview no url View raw submissions ↗
  3. Ability to exit tentative 3/3 models agree AI-only 0/3 with chat share link
    USDe redemption is operator-mediated and can be disabled with no on-chain expiry
    Verdict

    Choosing red because the main USDe redemption path is not permissionless: EthenaMintingV2.redeem is only callable by REDEEMER_ROLE, requires signed order verification, and the admin/gatekeeper controls can set redeem capacity to zero with no source-level expiry, while no permissionless forced redemption path was found.

    Steelman argument
    Steelman argument USDe collateral redemption requires an authorized REDEEMER_ROLE operator and can be disabled indefinitely by zeroing redeem caps, so users cannot unilaterally exit to backing under adversarial admin/operator conditions.
    Evidence (7)
    E1
    The deployed exit surfaces checked were EthenaMintingV2.redeem(Order,Signature) for USDe-to-collateral redemption, and StakedUSDeV2.withdraw, redeem, cooldownAssets, cooldownShares, and unstake for sUSDe-to-USDe exit. USDe burn/burnFrom destroys USDe but does not return backing, so it was not treated as an exit.
    E2
    EthenaMintingV2.redeem is external but restricted by onlyRole(REDEEMER_ROLE), nonReentrant, per-asset and global max-redeem-per-block checks, and order verification. StakedUSDeV2.withdraw and redeem require ensureCooldownOff, cooldownAssets and cooldownShares require ensureCooldownOn, and unstake checks cooldownEnd or cooldownDuration==0 without a role modifier.
    E3
    The pause-equivalent control for USDe redemption is cap-based: DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can set global/per-asset redeem caps, and GATEKEEPER_ROLE can set global mint and redeem caps to zero via disableMintRedeem, with no auto-expiry in the deployed source. Constructor evidence identifies 0x3B0AAf6e6fCd4a7cEEf8c92C32DFeA9E64dC1862 as the admin, and Etherscan identifies that address as an Ethena Safe multisig; Ethena's repository describes the admin multisig as 7-of-10.
    E4
    The emergency path is GATEKEEPER_ROLE.disableMintRedeem, which can only disable mint/redeem and remove hot roles; the governance/admin path is DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, which can set redeem caps, manage roles, and later re-enable. The deployed source does not impose a time cap on either the zero-cap state or role removal.
    E5
    sUSDe exits are queued when cooldownDuration is nonzero: cooldownAssets/cooldownShares burn shares into the USDeSilo and set cooldownEnd to block.timestamp plus cooldownDuration, while setCooldownDuration is admin-only and capped by MAX_COOLDOWN_DURATION=90 days. I found no sUSDe daily withdrawal cap in the checked staking source, but USDe collateral redemption has per-block caps that admin/gatekeeper can zero.
    E6
    I found no permissionless forced-exit or escape-hatch that lets a USDe holder redeem backing if the Ethena redeemer role, backend order flow, whitelist, or redeem caps are unavailable. The repository describes secondary-market sale as the alternative for large or unavailable direct redemptions, not an on-chain forced exit.
    E7
    The deployed contracts are verified on Etherscan and expose the relevant write functions directly, so sUSDe exit and authorized USDe redemption transactions can be submitted without Ethena's frontend; however USDe redemption itself still requires a REDEEMER_ROLE caller and a valid signed order flow.
    Why is this consensus tentative?
    • weak consensus margin
    • only 0/3 sources have a public chat share link

    A fresh independent run can strengthen (or overturn) the verdict.

    Run your own prompt Submit run ↗
    Sources claude-opus-4-7 no url gpt-5.5 no url gemini-3-flash-preview no url View raw submissions ↗
  4. Autonomy tentative 3/3 models agree AI-only 0/3 with chat share link
    Protocol cannot run without CeFi custodians (Copper/Ceffu/Anchorage/Kraken) and CEX hedging venues (Binance ~50%, Bybit, OKX, Deribit, Bitget); ~70-89% of TVS depends on off-chain operators whose failure can impair principal beyond the ~$62M reserve fund.
    Verdict

    Choosing red because the orange steel-man understates two structural facts: (a) the Oct 10 2025 incident on Binance (USDe to $0.65) was not a hypothetical — it demonstrated that loss of CEX liquidity / ADL events directly impair USDe principal value via the hedge leg, not just unclaimed yield; and (b) the keeper/operator role (A8) is exclusive to Ethena Labs — no permissionless actor can re-hedge if Ethena ops go offline, making operator liveness a hard principal-risk dependency. Green is wrong because the immutable ERC20 surface only matters once you hold tokens; the mint/redeem promise (which underpins the peg) is entirely gated on CeFi infrastructure that is verifiably governance-mutable (A9: BNB added, Anchorage/Kraken added 2025-2026, no documented timelock). Impacted-TVS estimate: 70-89% of TVS sits with custodians and CEXes; a coordinated failure of the dominant venue (Binance) compounded with reserve-fund exhaustion (LlamaRisk: 33 days at -10% funding) puts material principal at risk. Module weighting: USDe core ~89% (red), USDtb-backed reserve ~11% (orange — RWA risk concentrated in single fund); weighted overall = red because the red module is dominant and the cross-cutting CEX/custodian dependency is not user-opt-in per market.

    Steelman argument
    Steelman argument USDe is fundamentally a CeFi product wrapped in an ERC20: ~89% of backing currently sits at off-exchange-settlement custodians (Copper/Ceffu/Anchorage/Kraken) with hedges concentrated ~50% on Binance, where the Oct 10 2025 ADL cascade pushed USDe to $0.65 — a documented principal-risk event driven by a CEX dependency the protocol cannot operate without; the operator (Ethena Labs) holds exclusive access to those venues and can neither be replaced permissionlessly nor pause without user loss if a major venue halts withdrawals.
    Evidence (9)
    A1
    Core USDe contract (0x4c9EDD5852cd905f086C759E8383e09bff1E68B3) is a vanilla immutable ERC20 with minter role; the actual backing/hedging logic lives off-chain at custodians and CEXes, not on-chain. Mint/redeem pricing relies on CeFi exchange feeds (Binance, Bybit, OKX, Deribit, BitMEX, Bitget) cross-checked by Pyth and Redstone — no Chainlink.
    A2
    Off-chain operators reporting INTO the protocol: (a) Ethena Labs operators who execute hedges and rebalances, (b) custodian attestation providers (Copper, Ceffu, Anchorage Digital, Kraken — monthly attestations), (c) Pyth+Redstone price feeds used as sanity check before every mint/redeem. Multisig actor classes: Dev Multisig 5-of-11 (0x3b0aaf6e...), Reserve Fund 4-of-10 (0x2b5ab59...), sUSDe Payout 3-of-11. None are timelocked per docs.
    A3
    USDe token has been bridged across many chains via LayerZero OFT, but the canonical mint/redeem and the hedge collateral remain on Ethereum + CEX accounts. Bridge dependency is per-chain user opt-in, not protocol-wide.
    A4
    Backing composition (Q1 2026, post-Oct-10 deleveraging): perp short positions ~11% (down from majority pre-crash), USDtb (BlackRock BUIDL + USDC) majority share, plus liquid stablecoins. USDtb itself depends on Securitize/BlackRock BUIDL (TradFi RWA) — a failure of BUIDL or Securitize redemption directly impairs USDe collateral. Reserve fund $62M (Mar 2026) entirely held in USDtb + USDtb/USDC LP — single-asset concentration.
    A5
    DefiLlama forkedFrom: empty for ethena-usde — original design, no fork lineage.
    A6
    Fallback mechanisms (activation status): (i) LIVE — multi-source oracle sanity check (CeFi+Pyth+Redstone) before mint/redeem; daily/intra-day OES settlement cycles (Copper Clearloop daily; Bybit 2h, OKX 4h, Bitget 4h) cap unsettled PnL; bankruptcy-remote trusts / MPC at custodians; (i) LIVE — $62M reserve fund (~9x LlamaRisk conservative tail). NOT MITIGATED: cannot continue minting/redeeming if a primary OES provider goes offline; cannot rehedge in real-time if a primary CEX (Binance =~50%) suffers ADL/withdrawal halt — Oct 10 2025 saw USDe trade as low as $0.65 on Binance during cascading liquidations + ADL.
    A7
    Protocol deployed on Ethereum L1 — no additional sequencer/DA dependency beyond substrate.
    A8
    Protocol REQUIRES Ethena-Labs-operated keepers/traders to maintain delta-neutral hedge: open new shorts, roll funding, rebalance across venues. This is NOT permissionless — only Ethena Labs has API keys/credentials at custodians and CEXes. If the operator goes dark, hedge drift accumulates (gamma exposure to ETH/BTC), funding accrues without rebalancing, and reserve fund depletes (LlamaRisk: 33 days at -10% funding + 0.5% daily redemptions + 10bps slippage). Failure mode is catastrophic, not graceful.
    A9
    Governance-mutable external dependency surface: Dev Multisig (5/11) owns mainnet contracts and 'can modify contract parameters' per docs — including the ability to add/remove custodians, change OES providers, add new hedge venues, swap oracle sources without disclosed timelock or user exit window. New backing assets (e.g., BNB approved, XRP/HYPE under discussion) and new custodians (Anchorage 2025, Kraken Jan 2026) have been added by governance during the protocol's lifetime — confirming this surface is actively used. No 7-day timelock on these changes documented.
    Why is this consensus tentative?
    • only 0/3 sources have a public chat share link
    • total support weight 0.12 below confidence floor (1.5)

    A fresh independent run can strengthen (or overturn) the verdict.

    Run your own prompt Submit run ↗
    Sources claude-opus-4-7 no url gpt-5.5 no url gemini-3-flash-preview no url View raw submissions ↗
  5. Open Access tentative 3/3 models agree AI-only 0/3 with chat share link
    Direct Ethena mint/redeem is whitelisted and operator-submitted; sUSDe also has onchain restriction roles
    Verdict

    Choosing red because the evidence shows two grade-determinative admission gates: direct Ethena mint/redeem is limited to whitelisted API users and onchain execution by Ethena MINTER/REDEEMER role holders, while sUSDe has enforceable onchain soft/full restriction roles that can block staking, transfers, and withdrawals for selected addresses; permissionless USDe transfers and direct sUSDe access for unrestricted users do not remove those core admission controls.

    Steelman argument
    Steelman argument The strongest red case is that core direct mint/redeem requires Ethena whitelisting plus Ethena-controlled MINTER/REDEEMER submission, and sUSDe has onchain roles that can block or freeze staking-related entry/exit for selected addresses.
    Evidence (7)
    A1
    USDe transfers are not gated in the USDe token source, but primary USDe issuance/redemption is gated because EthenaMinting.mint and mintWETH require MINTER_ROLE and redeem requires REDEEMER_ROLE; the staking contracts also define soft and full restricted staker roles that block deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or unstake paths for assigned addresses.
    A2
    For direct Ethena mint/redeem, the admission path requires an Ethena RFQ/order flow: the API docs say only whitelisted users can use the API, the order process has Ethena receive orders and submit them onchain, and the role table identifies MINTER and REDEEMER as Ethena Labs EOAs; by contrast, sUSDe staking deposit/cooldown placement is direct smart-contract interaction for users not assigned restriction roles, while reward transfers are liveness/accounting rather than admission.
    A3-passive
    The official Terms restrict Services users by age, sanctions status, and prohibited jurisdictions, and say Ethena may use IP-based geofencing; I did not verify a runtime block banner, HTTP 451, KYC wall, or wallet-screening rejection during this run.
    A3b-ii
    Ethena documents independent access paths for at least staking and protocol interaction: staking can be done directly or via the dApp UI, the App is described as non-essential, developers are described as free to create their own interfaces, and Etherscan exposes Read/Write Contract tabs for deployed contracts.
    A4
    The sUSDe staking layer has sanctions/compliance tooling: a Blacklister role can grant or remove soft/full restricted staker roles, fully restricted users cannot receive sUSDe, and the default admin can redistribute locked sUSDe from fully restricted addresses.
    A5
    Read access is public through Etherscan and docs, but write access differs by function class: USDe transfer/burn/permit are ordinary ERC20-style actions, Ethena direct mint/redeem is role/operator/API-whitelist gated, sUSDe deposit/cooldown/unstake is user-callable unless the address is restricted, and full restriction blocks sUSDe transfer.
    A6
    The Terms include a verbatim eligibility clause: "You must be 18 years of age or older and not be a Prohibited Person to use the Services."
    Why is this consensus tentative?
    • weak consensus margin
    • only 0/3 sources have a public chat share link
    • total support weight 1.42 below confidence floor (1.5)

    A fresh independent run can strengthen (or overturn) the verdict.

    Run your own prompt Submit run ↗
    Sources claude-opus-4-7 no url gpt-5.5 no url gemini-3-flash-preview no url View raw submissions ↗

Stage

Preview of the Phase-3 maturity framework. DeFiPunk'd will adopt DeFiScan v2's stages verbatim; the section is rendered below in its intended shape so the structure is visible today.

Ethena USDe has not yet been assessed under the DeFiScan v2 stage framework.
The walkaway test is the central criterion. Once stages land, protocols reach Stage 1 only if users can exit in the presence of malicious operators even when the emergency council disappears.
Scope of assessment
Stages are assessed per-protocol against DeFiScan v2's criteria: governance structure, upgradeability path, timelock durations, emergency-council scope, and the walkaway test. The analysis depends on onchain discovery (roles, owners, timelocks) and deeper review of deployed contracts — neither of which DeFiPunk'd automates at Phase 0.
Stage 0 requirements pending
Governance is largely off-chain, contracts are upgradeable with short or no timelock, and the protocol depends on a multisig or team with full discretion. At Phase 0 DeFiPunk'd does not automatically evaluate these; the assessment lands with crawler-based onchain discovery.
Stage 1 requirements pending
Users can exit or opt out on their own terms even if the team disappears. Upgrades run through a meaningful timelock with an emergency security council clearly scoped. The walkaway test is the headline criterion.
Stage 2 requirements pending
Protocol is fully permissionless and immutable, or upgrades require a supermajority of token holders with a long timelock and no emergency override. This is the terminal stage of the DeFiScan v2 framework.
Learn more about DeFiScan v2 stages →
Stages are an opinionated assessment of maturity, not a rating of security or safety. A protocol can sit at Stage 2 and still carry substantial technical or economic risk; the framework exists to incentivize decentralization, not to rank protocols.

Contract surface

Every contract in scope for this protocol — pooled from DeFiLlama's TVL adapter (mechanical) and DEFI@home discovery submissions (LLM-curated). Verified-source flags come from Etherscan + Sourcify; owner / multisig metadata is read on-chain when available. Reviewer audit context, not a slice score. A lending protocol's adapter set will list third-party collateral tokens alongside its own contracts; attribution is the grader's job.

  • 17addresses
  • 5verified source
  • 4proxies
  • 1of 3 owners are Safes

TVL adapter pinned at 683d369. Sourcecode fetched 2026-05-06. Control fetched 2026-05-07.

ethereum0x2d4d…7bb4TVL
ethereumTransparentUpgradeableProxy0xc139…ac1cTVLproxy0xd938…3956
ethereum0xd54f…92fbTVL
ethereumGnosisSafeProxy0x2b5a…d4d5TVL + discproxyself 4/10
ethereumERC1967Proxy0xa393…7fbdTVLproxy
ethereumFiatTokenProxy0xa0b8…eb48TVLproxy0xfcb1…ae3a
ethereumUSDe0x4c9e…68b3TVL + disc0x3b0a…18625/11 Safe
Ethereumadmin multisig0x2b07…9503discoverymultisig
Ethereumadmin multisig0x2b5a…5e2ddiscoverymultisig
Ethereumadmin multisig0x71e4…9c5bdiscoverymultisig
Ethereumdev multisig (owner of deployed mainnet smart contracts)0x3b0a…1862discoverymultisig
Ethereumethena multisig0x2b7f…7097discoverymultisig
EthereumEtherscan contract page for StakingRewardsDistributor. Confirmed rewards distribution contract for sUSDe yield.0xf2fa…b439discovery
EthereumEtherscan verified contract page for sUSDe staking vault (ERC4626-based StakedUSDeV2). Confirmed staking contract.0x9d39…3497discoveryvault
Ethereummain multisig0x78b6…a512discoverymultisig
EthereumsUSDe payout multisig (distributes USDe to staking rewards distributor)0x71e4…3a87discoverymultisig
Ethereumtimelock0x1870…3679discoverytimelock

Protocol Info

Links

[defillama] Source: DeFiLlama [:] Source: DEFI@home quorum
Twitter
@ethena_labs
GitHub
ethena-labs
Governance forum
https://governance.ethena.fi

Security

[defillama] Source: DeFiLlama [:] Source: DEFI@home quorum
Audits
5 audits
Security contact
security@ethena.fi

Technical

[:] Source: DEFI@home quorum
Voting token
ENA Ethereum: 0x57e114B691Db790C35207b2e685D4A43181e6061
Upgradeability
Immutable

Provenance

[defillama] Source: DeFiLlama
Review status
listed
Updated
2026-06-01 11:27 UTC